This paper investigates how changes in the retail mortgage rates affected real housing prices in New Zealand during the period 1999-2009. We find that the real interest rate, measured by the real fixed rate, is positively related to the real housing price, after controlling for the effect of real rental rates, unemployment rates and housing credit.
Introduction
The recent subprime crisis has attracted many researchers to investigate the determinants of housing prices, especially to investigate whether the low level of the Federal funds rate during 2002 to 2005 caused the housing bubble, i.e., the housing price growing at a rate much higher than that of the household income. However, most studies focus on the U.S. housing market, even though other countries showed large increases in house prices and subsequent adverse consequences. In this article, we focus on New Zealand, a much smaller country that suffered less from the subprime crises, as compared to the U.S, but where there was still official concern as to the extent of increase in housing prices (Bollard and Smith, 2006) .
In this article, we investigate the determinants of the real housing price in New
Zealand during [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In particular, we focus on investigating whether increases in the official cash rate (OCR), the policy rate set by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) eight times a year, depress the real housing price. Previous study has examined how this policy rate passes through to retail interest rates. For example, Tripe, McDermott and Petro (2005) found that since the RBNZ introduced the OCR in 1999, key lending interest rates had become more responsive to changes in underlying wholesale rates and RBNZ monetary policy thus became more efficient. 1 More recently, Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad (2008) found that the introduction of OCR increased the pass-through of floating, but not fixed mortgage rates. These previous studies, however, have not explored how the OCR affects real or nominal housing prices. Given that the relationship between the monetary policy and the housing price is so complex, researchers have not yet reached a consensus conclusion regarding the issue which we focus on (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).
As Shiller (2006) suggests, monetary policy, which has the potential to affect the interest rates and hence the discount rate of households, should affect housing prices.
Some evidence for this is evident in research from the USA (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 2007) , but the effect would be expected to be stronger in New Zealand because of the greater sensitivity of mortgage lending rates to monetary policy rates (reflecting the more frequent repricing of loans). A recent study by Cho and Ma (2006) that analysed the long-run relationship between housing values and interest rates in Korea confirmed this. They found that a long-term negative relationship existed between housing values and interest rates. They further concluded that monetary policy worked very effectively. However, they implicitly assume that long-term market interest rates follow changes of the policy rate immediately. 2 We would expect this effect to apply to short-term rates, but not so immediately to longer term rates.
In this article, we first examine the relationship between the OCR and the two types of mortgage loan available on the New Zealand housing market, i.e., floatingrate loans which allow rates to be changed more or less immediately in response to changes in the underlying cost of funds, and fixed-rate loans, where rates may be fixed for up to five years. We find that the OCR Granger causes the real fixed-rate, but that it does not have as much of an impact on real floating-rates. The real interest rate, both fixed and floating, in turn Granger causes the announced OCR.
We then test the relationship between the real housing price and the real interest rate based on the present value model described by Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b) .
The model predicts that the real housing price is positively related to the real rental rate, but negatively related to the household's real discount rate. We use both the real fixed-rate and floating-rate to proxy the household's real discount rate. After 2 See also McDonald & Stokes (2011, forthcoming) who show a relationship between short term interest rates in the United States (the fed funds rate) and nominal house prices.
controlling for the impact of the real rental rate, we find that each of these two proxies exhibits a positive effect on the real housing price. Thus, we reach two conclusions.
First, increases in the OCR did not depress housing prices in New Zealand over recent periods, particularly during the 2001 to 2007 period when the OCR increased from 5% to 8.25% per annum. Second, households' real discount rate exhibits a positive effect on real housing prices, thus indicating that the housing bubble in New Zealand was more severe than that in the U.S. where decreases in real interest rates could explain 20% increases in real housing prices (Glaeser et al., 2010) . A bubble is identified by an extraordinary escalation in prices which cannot be justified by underlying economic factors, and which cannot therefore be sustained. As Stiglitz (1990) suggests, a bubble exists if the reason that prices are high today is only because the investors believe that selling prices will be high (or higher) tomorrow. We suggest that this bubble may have been facilitated by the long-term favourable taxation treatment in housing investment.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Section 2 describes interestrate setting in New Zealand and the monetary policy process of the RBNZ. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and econometric tools used in this research.
Section 4 describes the data utilised. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 provides conclusions.
Interest rates
The RBNZ currently has an inflation target of 1 to 3% per annum, over the medium term. Adherence to this target provides the basis for its monetary policy. The OCR is the key policy rate for its implementation of monetary policy, and defines the rate banks may earn if they deposit funds with the RBNZ (overnight), or if they borrow from it (on a repo basis), with there being a 50 basis points spread between the borrowing and lending rates. The rate is an overnight rate, and thus affects the rates banks charge each other for overnight borrowing. 3 It provides an anchor for the very short end of the yield curve, with market rates for longer maturities being impacted by the usual range of influences on the shape of the yield curve, and it will have a stronger impact on short term rates than on longer term rates.
The OCR is subject to a regular review process eight times a year, although on one occasion (19 September 2001), it was changed at other than a regular, scheduled review date. This means that, following an OCR review, the dates of which are scheduled 12 months or more in advance, there will not be expected to be any change for another 6 to 7 weeks, and the actual overnight market rate will remain relatively stable accordingly (at more or less the OCR).
Because the OCR is used to try and influence future levels of inflation, one should expect it to be higher at times of higher inflation: real interest rates should be less variable than nominal rates (such as the OCR). In recent times, the OCR reached 
Methodology

Present value model
This paper follows the present value model to investigate how the real rental rate and the real interest rate affect the real housing price. Shiller (2006) argued that house prices should be equal to the present discounted value of future rents. His model implies that house prices are positively related to rental rates, but negatively related to the household's discount rate. It is logical to infer that the time-varying discount rates are closely linked to the retail mortgage rates prevailing in the housing market.
A linear present value model with a constant discount rate is written as follows:
where P t is the current asset price at time t, D t is the dividend or cash flow at time t and R is the constant expected discount rate. On the right-hand side of Equation (1), the first term is called the fundamental value, and the second term the price bubble.
When n is sufficiently large, the second term will converge to zero. Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b) suggest transforming Equation (1) into a log linear present value model with time-varying expected returns, where the logarithmic asset price at time t is written as follows:
where
is the average log dividend-price ratio,
. When the time horizon n increases to infinity, the third term on the right-hand of Equation (2), which is the discounted expected value of asset price, will shrink to zero. Accordingly, the current asset price will become:
This equation implies that log asset prices are positively correlated to future dividends, but negatively related to future expected returns. Equation (3), which is also referred to as the dynamic Gordon growth model (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a, b) , can be rewritten in terms of the log dividend-price ratio, i.e.,
The above dynamic Gordon growth model implies that the dividend-price ratio must be equal to the present discounted value of expected future cash flows and the expected asset's future returns. The model has been successful in describing returns in the stock market and has also been applied to the real estate market, in particular for the study of house price bubbles and volatility over the recent housing price boom. We use the standard ADF unit root test to test for the stationarity of all variables.
We find that both the real housing price and the real interest rate follow the unit root.
Thus, we take the first-order difference for these two series, of which do not follow the unit root. We then take into account of location differences to specify the dynamic relationship among the real house price, the real rent and the real interest rates as follows:
where p, d and m are log prices, log rents and mortgage rates, X is vector of economic variables, a 0 is constant, i denotes different cities, t denotes the time period, S j denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables ( 1 j S  for month j , and 0
 is the white noise, and Δ denotes the first difference.
Price bubbles
House price bubbles are reflected in people buying houses on the basis of returns from capital gains on houses, rather than from the utility of living in them as homes.
The capital gains seem to be earned all too easily, and there is a reluctance to see that these may not continue because they are not readily justifiable by simple efficientmarket models. These high prices may persist for some time.
Under the present value model, if a self-fulfilling price bubble does exist, stock prices and dividends will not be cointegrated or the dividend-price ratio will not be stationary. However, a finding of non-cointegration between stock prices and dividends does not necessarily imply a price bubble exists. This is because there may be unobserved factors in market fundamentals causing this non-stationarity. The key question is how we define fundamental values. Nevertheless, finding of this noncointegration has been widely viewed as a key indicator for asset bubbles. In empirical tests, cointegration and unit root tests between stock prices and dividends
give mixed findings depending on the time period studied. Through using the annual US stocks market data from 1871 to 1986, Campbell and Shiller (1987) 
Data Description
This research utilised a rich data set of 528,601 freehold ( City, Waitakere City, Manukau City, Wellington City and Christchurch City. We choose these six cities because they accounted for more than 50% of New Zealand housing stock and periodical sales volume. It is important to consider sample sizes when measuring local house price movements by using Case-Shiller (1987) weighted repeated sale (WRS) method. As the repeat sales method uses only repeated sales for index construction, the index is more prone to sample selection bias than other index methods that use all transaction sales data. Previous work indicates that the frequently traded houses (sold more than twice within a period of time) are more likely to be the "starter" houses or houses for opportune buyers (Clapp and Giaccotto, 1992; Haurin and Hendershott, 1991) . Previous study also indicates that the repeat sales index is prone to a systematic downward revision due to lagged sales (Clapham et al., 2006) .
To minimise these two problems, we measure local house price indices over an extended time period from 1994 to 2009. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of house sales and the numbers of dwelling, both of which indicate that we employ a sufficient sample size of repeated sales, and thus minimize the sample selection bias. Note that our study uses real house prices, which are nominal house prices adjusted by the CPI (Consumers Price Index).
QV also produces a house price index but it is on a quarterly basis. The QV index is based on the Sale Price Appraisal Ratio (SPAR) method, which takes the ratios of current sale prices and their previous assessed values to construct an index.
Comparing with the quarterly reported index, our estimated monthly price index will unsmooth the price movement and increase the number of observations in a time series analysis. Another reason to estimate house price movements on a monthly basis is because most the interest rate data are reported on a monthly basis in New Zealand.
<Insert Table 1> As the repeat sales method is vulnerable to outliers (Meese and Wallace, 1997),
we use prior knowledge to eliminate all multiple sales where the second sale price is less than 0.7 or more than 2.5 times the first sale price. Moreover, since the QV data includes building consent information for all the studied cities except Auckland City, we further eliminate the quality changed repeat sales, thus minimizing the constant quality problem faced by the standard repeat sales method. 5 In total, we exclude 15%
and 24% of initial pair sales from the final index estimation, depending on various local housing markets. We ended our data set at 2009 because it was the latest year for which we held a complete sale data set.
We obtain monthly rental data for detached or semi-detached houses from the Figure 1 shows the real housing price and the real rental rate in Auckland city, the real OCR, the real rate for a floating mortgage loan, and the real rate for a 5-year fixed mortgage loan during 1999 to 2009. We find that the real housing price is positively correlated with these four explanatory variables, with the correlation coefficients being 72.1%, 32.2%, 53.4%, and 1.7%, respectively (although with the less frequent repricing, this last relationship is much weaker). This preliminary result contrasts significantly with the U.S. In the U.S., the rental rate is also positive correlated with the housing price, but the interest rate, no matter whether floating or fixed, is negatively correlated with the housing price (Glaeser et al., 2010).
Empirical Results
<Insert Figure 1> 5.1 Co-movement between OCR and retail mortgage rates
We first look at the correlation coefficient between log real OCR changes and log real retail mortgage rate changes. The result is shown in Table 2 , which indicates that the OCR is more closely related to the shorter-term mortgage rates. For example, the correlation coefficient between the real OCR and the real floating-rate is 0.75, while it drops gradually to 0.35 between the real OCR and the real 5-year fixed-rate.
The result is expected as the short-term interest rate is more directly linked to the overnight cash rate while the long-term interest rate is linked to the corresponding bond yields, linked to the OCR predominantly through expectations for the trend in the OCR.
<Insert Table 2> We then employ the Granger causality test to see whether changes in the real OCR lead changes in the real retail interest rate or vice versa. We present the result in Table 3 , which shows that we reject both hypotheses for longer term rates, that the OCR change does not Granger cause the retail real interest rate change and that the retail real interest rate change does not Granger cause the OCR change, at the 5% significance level. Therefore, it appears that Granger causality runs two-way either from the real OCR change to the real retail interest rate change or from the retail real interest rate change to the OCR change for longer term rates. In contrast the Granger causality runs one-way from the real retail interest rate changes to the real OCR changes for shorter term rates. The result is plausible because of keen market competition between banks. In fact, the announced change of the OCR often provides banks with a good reason to adjust their retail interest rates. 8 On the other hand, banks might change their shorter fixed term mortgage lending rates prior to the OCR announcement because they anticipate the policy change or simply have to follow the preemptive actions of other lenders in changing their mortgage rates. Overall, the result shows that the implementation of monetary policy through changes in the OCR has a direct impact on retail mortgage rates, especially the short-term (floating) mortgage lending rate. The relationship with longer term rates is likely to be an indication of the way in which long-term rates predict future shorter-term rates. This is suggesting that the yield curve is acting as a relatively reliable predictor of future rates. If the OCR did not respond to changes in other interest rates it is likely that we would regard the implementation of monetary policy as somewhat erratic.
<Insert Table 3> 5.2 House price dynamics Table 4 reports the regression results of the house price dynamics based on the present value model specified in Equation (5). It shows that house price changes are positively correlated to changes in the real rental rate and the retail real interest rate, no matter whether floating or fixed. However, the real fixed-rate shows more impact on the housing price than the real floating-rate. For example, 1% increase in the firstorder difference of changes of the real floating-rate will significantly (at the 10% level of significance) increase the first-order difference of the housing price by 0.093%.
The same change of the first-order difference of the real 1-year fixed rate will significantly (at the 5% level of significance) increase the first-order difference of the housing price by 0.589%.
Our result indicates that households' real discount rate exhibits a positive effect on the real housing price. As shown by Campbell et al. (2009) the link between the level of house prices and real interest rates is more complex than history suggested and changes in risk-free interest rates may not have much impact on house prices.
However, our result departs from the results suggested by the standard economic theory such as the present value model, thus indicating that a price bubble might exist.
As compared to the literature, our regression model specified in Equation (5) disregards two sets of factors. The first one is demand fundamentals such as employment and income (Campbell et al., 2009; Wheaton and Nechayev, 2008) , and net immigration (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). We argue that the rental rate should reflect fundamental supply and demand factors in the housing market (Campbell et al., 2009 ). The second one is the credit market terms such as the loan-to-value ratio and approval rates (Glaeser et al., 2010) . While the data on these terms can be obtained in the U.S., detailed information on loan terms is not generally published by financial firms in New Zealand. <Insert Table 4> 5
.3 Bubble indicators
To further investigate the relationship between real house prices and real interest rates, we followed Glaeser et al. (2010) by reporting the results of a series of regressions of the log real house price index on real interest rates and other covariates.
The bubble period is then indicated by the positive relationship between real house prices and real interest rates. Since the full breakdown of fixed mortgage rates is not available prior to 1998, we use the floating mortgage rate for this analysis. The results are detailed in Table 5 . 9 There was, however, some recognition of a potential easing of credit standards, as instanced by comments in Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2007), pp 25-26. <Insert Table 5> Model 1 (Table 5, to the analysis (see Table 5 , column 3 and 4) does not change the results to any major extent.
For the period 2004 to 2006, policy rates were set low but increased slowly when compared to previous levels. The findings are in line with the self-fulfilling nature of a price bubble. For a price bubble, prices must grow faster than the discount rate in order to compensate for the probability of the bubble bursting. The findings may suggest that the bubble was started by a low policy rate setting with no impact from the slow increase of policy rates over time. Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2009 argues that the low level of the Federal funds rate was the main reason why the U.S. experienced housing price inflation during the mid-2000s.
Unemployment and house lending
To address the concern of demand fundamentals and credit market conditions on house prices, we include two further variables -unemployment rate and housing lending data, to equation (5). 10 The idea is to test if this positive relationship between real house prices and real interest rates found in Table 4 changes once we control for those variables. Our hypothesis is that the change in unemployment rate will be negatively correlated to the change of house prices while the change in housing lending will be positively related to the change of house prices, but negatively related to the change of interest rates. The more money that is poured into the housing market, the higher housing prices will be. On the other hand a higher interest rate will dampen the demand for the housing lending. The difficulty is the problem of causation, as it could be either a higher house prices causes increases in housing credit lending or that increased housing lending leads to higher house prices. In this analysis, house lending variable has been estimated by the percentage change of real house lending. The regression model is presented as follows and the results are presented in Table 6 .
where E t represents the percentage change of unemployment rate at time t, C t represents the percentage change of real house lending at time t. All other are same as those defined in equation (5).
<Insert Table 6> The results show that the change of house lending positively causes price changes and negatively correlates to the short-term interest rate changes up to 1 year.
For rates longer than 1 year, both interest rates and housing lending were positively related to house price changes although the impact of interest rates on house prices became statistically insignificant. Thus it appears the household's short-term and long-term discount rates for housing are quite different. An increase in short-term interest rate will cause house prices to drop, while an increase in long-term rates may push house prices up. In other words the longer term rates are likely to contribute to the bubble, while the shorter rates do not. But why should this be the case?
We suggest that the cause may lie in the shape of the yield curve, the mix of fixed and floating rate lending, and the average size of fixed and floating rate loans.
During the potential bubble period (2004 to 2006), the yield curve was consistently negatively sloping, with longer term fixed rates consistently cheaper than floating rates. This meant that borrowers who wanted significant amounts of debt were often encouraged to take on fixed rate loans, both to reduce immediate debt servicing costs, and to reduce their exposure to future interest rate increases which might have made their housing financing unviable. We thus saw an increase in the relative proportion of fixed rate lending (as can be seen in Figure 2 ), while the size of the average fixed rate loan (between $115,000 and $130,000 between 2004 and 2006) was much larger than the size of the average floating rate loan (generally between $50,000 and $55,000 over the same period). Borrowers who had floating rate loans were likely to be much less concerned about the effects of interest rate changes as the amount of their debt meant that the impact was going to be relatively small. The serious borrowing was undertaken at fixed rates, and even though fixed rates increased through this period, this was not enough to put borrowers off, when they perceived that property prices would continue to increase.
Another plausible explanation is that New Zealand has consistently offered favourable taxation treatment toward second and investment home purchases.
Investors and second home buyers who hold the asset in long term will pay no tax on capital gain at sale. There is no explicit rule on the minimum length of holding period by the Inland Revenue (tax) Department, but the market generally takes this as 2 years.
Therefore households' real long-term discount rates could afford increased long term real interest rates in exchange for no capital gains tax at future sales, especially when people are expecting future capital gains. This might cause a more severe bubble problem for New Zealand than in other countries.
Hedging effect of mortgage rate changes
Mortgage borrowers have some leeway in choosing between fixed and floating rate loans. If more borrowers choose fixed rates, changes in the floating mortgage rates will have less direct impact on housing prices. This could result in our estimated interest rate impacts on prices being relatively small, as shown in Table 5 . Figure 2 shows the ratio of value of floating mortgage to the value of overall mortgage loans <Insert Figure 2> As indicated by the literature (see, e.g., Follain (1990)), mortgage choice is endogenously determined with the differential between the fixed and floating rates being the pivotal determinant. To accommodate this endogenous problem we used instrument variables in a two-stage least squares regression. Since the ratio of the value of floating loan to overall mortgage loan is a unit root, we use the percentage change of the ratio in the analysis. The regression model is as follows:
where R t is the change of the ratio at time t. The ratio is calculated as the value of floating loan to the overall value of mortgage loan. k is representing the various mortgage rates from floating to fixed rates. I k are instrumental variables representing the differentials between the various mortgage rates. The instrumental variables are believed to be correlated to the mortgage rate choices but uncorrelated to the interest rate changes.
The estimated results are presented in Table 7 . The results show the hedging effect as significant in explaining the movement of real house prices. It works like an energy absorber to reduce the overall interest rate's impact on house prices. When interest rates move up, people start to favour fixed rates against the floating rate, particularly as floating rates are likely to move more than fixed rates, which in New
Zealand experience has often resulted in the yield curve becoming negative, and thus the ratio of the value of floating-rate loans to overall mortgage lending will drop. At long terms an increase in fixed rates will push up prices in a bubble environment but the decreased proportion of floating rate loans will do the opposite to decrease prices.
As a result our findings suggested the net effect of interest rates on housing prices is much weaker.
This has lent support to some authors' claims of a weak connection between interest rates and housing prices. Glaeser, et al (2010) argue that decreases in the real interest rate could only explain 20% increases in the real housing price, if one allows the interest rate to be mean reverting. Dokko et al. (2011) also follow this argument.
By investigating the data of 17 OECD countries, they find that the decrease in the policy rate of these countries is not the main reason for housing price inflation during the mid-2000s. They instead argue that it is more important to prudentially regulate the mortgage market such as implementing the control of the housing market credit lending. One implication of our findings for the monetary policy is since the connection between the interest rate and housing price is weak, policy makers should move the policy rate in a more severe manner in order to influence housing prices.
<Insert Table 7> Our results indicate that the housing bubble in New Zealand was more severe than in the U.S. While labour income may be taxed at 33% (the highest bracket), no comprehensive capital gains tax has been imposed on housing investment. Until the income tax year starting from April 1, 2011, rental residential property owners could also enjoy tax deductions from depreciation allowances and other costs (including interest), while owner-occupiers could not. This influenced investors' estimation of potential returns, and could also explain why the rate of home ownership declined in the recent years (see footnote 6). While a capital gains tax may be a weapon to prevent the bubble to arise again, it is difficult to implement in practice, as demonstrated by the failure of a series of tax working groups and inquiries (established by successive governments) to lead to any such tax being enacted following their discussions in 1967 , 1978 , 1982 , 1987 , 1988 , 1989 , 2001 , and 2009 -2010 (Huang and Elliffe, 2011 .
Conclusions
This paper investigates how changes in the official cash rate (OCR) affect real housing prices in New Zealand during 1999-2009. We find that the announced OCR changes Granger cause the real interest rate changes. We also find that the real interest rate, both fixed and floating, is positively related to the real housing price, after controlling for the effect of real rental rates. Thus, increases in the OCR do not depress the real housing price, indicating that a housing bubble prevails in the recent New Zealand housing market.
We also find that both the quantity of housing lending and the mix of fixed and floating rate lending matter, with the latter also impacted by the slope of the yield curve. This is something that it is not easy for governments or the Reserve Bank to control -intervention at the long end of the yield curve would make the implementation of monetary policy a much more complicated and expensive exercise.
Against such a background, the use of a capital gains tax to mitigate some of the excesses of housing price bubbles may be a more attractive option.
One of the limitations in this research has been the relatively short period over which we have been able to undertake it. This has meant that we have not seen as much variation in economic conditions as would be desirable to give our results more robustness, but the other side of this is that there is scope for further research with the passage of time, so that we can observe greater diversity in economic outcomes. 
where p, d and m are log prices, log rents and mortgage rates, a 0 is constant, i denotes different cities, t denotes the time period, S denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables, and ε is white noise. Δ denotes the first difference. The regression is run with a cross-section fixed effect (city dummy variables). 
where p, d and m are log prices, log rents and mortgage rates, a 0 is constant, i denotes different cities, t denotes the time period, E denotes the percentage change of unemployment rate, C denotes the percentage change of real house lending. S denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables, and ε is white noise. Δ denotes the first difference. The regression is run with a cross-section fixed effect (city dummy variables). Note: * indicates significance at 0.05 level; ** indicates significance at 0.01 level. The regression model is as follows:
where p, d and m are log prices, log rents and mortgage rates, a 0 is constant, i denotes different cities, t denotes the time period, E denotes the percentage change of unemployment rate, C denotes the percentage change of real house lending, R denotes the percentage change of the ratio of value of floating loan to the overall value of mortgage loan, S denotes the monthly seasonal dummy variables, and ε is white noise. Δ denotes the first difference. The regression is run with a cross-section fixed effect (city dummy variables).
k is representing the various mortgage rates from the floating to fixed rates. I k are instrumental variables representing the differentials between various fixed mortgage rates. 
